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Adapting for Survival:  
Islamic State Shifting Strategies1
Adaptar para Sobreviver:  




“I wonder if I’ve been changed in the night. Let me think.
Was I the same when I got up this morning?
I almost think I can remember feeling a little different.
But if I’m not the same, the next question is
‘Who in the world am I?’ Ah, that’s the great puzzle!”
                                Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
Abstract
This article discusses the strategic shifts that the Islamic State (IS) has implemented in order 
to survive, especially in what regards its propaganda and military tactics. We argue that – for 
a long time now and in both domains – the IS and its predecessors have been flexible and 
resilient enough to adapt to new realities on the ground being able to shape and reshape its 
strategy and tactics towards its enemies’ capabilities and policies. In terms of propaganda, 
despite a decrease of its online presence, the IS has struggled to adapt some of its main 
narratives to the new reality brought about by the beginning of the international coalition 
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attacks. However, evidence seems to suggest that the group will likely be able to maintain 
its online relevance yet for some time. Regarding its military tactics in Syria and Iraq, history 
and current evidence points to a return to its insurgent roots. This seems to be corroborated 
by the group’s current increasing resort to terrorism and guerrilla tactics. Lastly, we argue 
that it is still premature to either claim the rebirth of the IS or to declare its demise.
Keywords: Islamic State; Iraq; Propaganda; Insurgency; Terrorism.
Resumo
Este artigo discute as mudanças estratégicas que o Estado Islâmico (EI) tem implementado 
para sobreviver, especialmente no que diz respeito à sua propaganda e táticas militares. 
Argumentamos que, já há muito tempo e nas duas áreas, o EI e seus predecessores têm sido 
flexíveis e resilientes o suficiente para se adaptarem às novas realidades locais e moldarem 
e adaptarem suas estratégias e táticas às políticas e capabilities de seus inimigos. Em termos 
de propaganda, apesar de uma diminuição de sua presença on-line, o EI tem buscado adaptar 
algumas de suas narrativas principais à nova realidade trazida pelo início dos ataques da 
coalizão internacional. Contudo, a evidência aponta que o grupo provavelmente ainda será 
capaz de manter sua relevância on-line por algum tempo. No que diz respeito às suas táticas 
militares na Síria e Iraque, a história e as evidências atuais apontam para o retorno às suas 
raízes insurgentes. Isto parece ser corroborado pelo crescente recurso ao terrorismo e às 
táticas de guerrilha pelo grupo. Finalmente, argumentamos que ainda é prematuro declarar 
o renascimento ou a morte do EI.
Palavras Chave: Estado Islâmico; Insurgência; Iraque; Propaganda; Terrorismo.
Introduction
Over the last three and a half years, the Islamic State4 (IS) has been suffering 
uncountable defeats. The group has now lost over 90% of the territories it once 
controlled (HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b). The Iraqi and Syrian governments have even 
declared the defeat of the group while US has already signaled that the IS is no 
4 In this article, we chose to use the expression "Islamic State" to refer to the group also known as ISIS (Islamic 
State of Iraq and al-Sham); ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), or Daesh (al-Daula al-Islamiya al-Iraq 
wa Sham), since this is its most commonly used denomination. We are aware that the term "Islamic State" is 
inadequate to refer to the group as not only it is not a state but also several Islamic leaders strongly contest 
the "Islamic" nature of the group. Therefore, following Jacques Derrida, the use of this expression in this 
article should be understood as being "under erasure". In Derrida's words, being under erasure means that 
even though "these terms are problematic we must use them until they can be effectively reformulated or 
replaced."(DERRIDA, 1983, p.3).
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longer at the top of its security agenda (JOSCELYN, 2018). Nevertheless, many 
analysts have been warning that territorial losses of the organization does not 
necessarily imply its demise. In fact, there are increasing signs that the group 
may not even have been militarily defeated, let alone ideologically socially and 
politically (CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018).5
Evidence6 now suggests that the group has been recalibrating its strategies 
in at least two important areas – propaganda and military tactics – both of which 
will be the focus of this article. In order to understand how IS has been adapting 
its strategies in light of recent setbacks, we undertook a thematic analysis of its 
primary sources. To be more specific, we analysed their propaganda material as 
drawn from the Al Hayat Media Centre and Al Furqan as well as content drawn 
from social networks, especially Twitter. This analysis was further corroborated by 
the use of secondary sources. Amongst the secondary sources used, we opted for 
working mainly with material produced by local and/or on-the-ground researchers 
such as consultants of the Iraqi government (e.g. Renad Mansour and Hisham 
Al-Hashimi) as well as Syrian academics (e.g. Hassan Hassan and Aymenn al 
Tamimi). This was in part a deliberate choice and in part a decision incentivised 
by the content of this piece. Given that we are discussing on-going events that 
are continuously evolving, there is thus far, little engagement with this subject in 
academic publications. However, we have also consciously attempted to balance 
our secondary sources by also leveraging publications by academics from the 
global North whose research focusses upon monitoring the publications and/or 
strategic shifts of the Islamic State.
Thus, we will first shed light on the extent to which IS’s virtual productions 
have decreased since its territorial losses as well as highlight the key shifts in its 
narratives since the beginning of the attacks by the international coalition in Syria. 
However, while this article clearly demonstrates that IS’s propaganda structure is 
flexible enough to guarantee a degree of relevance in the near future, it is further 
stressed that the key problem with the idea of a “Virtual Caliphate” is that it falls 
into the trap of believing that the organization is already permanently defeated 
on the ground. In light of this assertion, we analyze how the IS has been adapting 
5 See also: JOSCELYN, 2018; DEMPSEY, 2018; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; BURKE, 2017, BUNZEL, 2016; 2017; 
COTTEE, 2017; COCKBURN, 2018; 2017; Al-AZM, 2017; MANSOUR; AL-HASHMI, 2017; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 
2017; ABRAMS, 2017; MESEROLE, 2017; SKY 2017.
6 This article is based on a thematic analysis of Islamic States’ primary sources. To be more specific, it is based 
on an analysis of their propaganda material as drawn from the Al Hayat Media Centre and Al Furqan as well 
as content from social networks. This analysis is further corroborated by secondary sources (see references).
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
106 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
its military approach in order to, first and foremost, survive thereby waiting for a 
more promising moment in which to re-invigorate their armed struggle. Finally, we 
peruse some possible scenarios for the IS’s future, especially the two most likely 
outcomes under discussion today: the first, that the IS is definitively finished, and 
the second; that the group, although weakened, will rise once again. In contrast, 
we posit that it is still too early to reliably predict either outcome.
A “Virtual Caliphate”?
The term “Virtual Caliphate” was initially used by the media and academia 
around 2015 less than a year after the organization proclaimed the creation of an 
Islamic Caliphate in the Levant. Winter was one of the first analysts who used the 
term to describe the entire apparatus of IS propaganda. He used the term virtual 
Caliphate to refer not only to IS’s propaganda structure and capacity but also 
to incorporate its strategy and support network comprised by formal members, 
informal fans, disseminators and “media operatives”7 (WINTER, 2015a; 2015b). 
Nevertheless, as the group progressively loses control of its territories inside Syria 
and Iraq, the term “Virtual Caliphate” has begun to be used in a different meaning. 
The term has recently been used to express the idea that the IS will survive only 
on the virtual battlefield relying on its online presence and propaganda strategy to 
both endure and retain its appeal. As it will be discussed below, this understanding 
is deeply problematic as it is founded upon the premature premise that the IS is 
facing an irreversible defeat on the ground (HASSAN, 2017b)8.
Indeed, it is likely that the organization and its ideology will survive on the 
internet9 (WINTER; PARKER, 2018). It will probably maintain itself as one of 
the most prominent Sunni jihadist groups, at least for the next few coming years 
7 In 2016, the IS published a document named “Media operative: You are a Mujahid too”. It reveals the extent to 
which the organization made efforts to inflate the ego of its online supporters by equating their importance to 
those who fights on battles. The IS argues that the jihad fought with words can be even more important than 
the jihad with the sword and thus considers its online fans who share jihadist contents true “virtual warriors” 
(WINTER, 2017a).
8 See also: CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; INGRAM; WHITESIDE, 2017.
9 Although it is probable that the IS ideology will survive online for some time yet, its ideology and part of its 
appeal has been intimately linked to the territorial aspect of its project. In this sense, the failure of the Caliphate 
may harm the IS’S attractiveness (COOLSAET, 2017). However, the extent to which it will impact the appeal 
of its narrative is still unknown as the narrative itself has also been adapting to the losses. See also: CLARKE; 
MOGHADAM, 2018; WINTER, 2017a; GAMBHIR, 2016.
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(GAMBHIR, 2016)10. The IS has long created a resilient propaganda strategy and 
structure that has been proving to be able to endure even in the face of both the 
reduction of its output capacity11 as well as the more controlled and policed internet 
(WINTER, 2017b)12. This resilience can be attributed to both the operational 
and material (content) characteristics of the IS’s propaganda machinery. On the 
operational side, the IS’s internet propaganda machinery is operated by different 
kinds of media operatives13 – such as formal and informal members – which 
grants it a strong capacity to adapt under unfavorable circumstances (LISTER 
2015a; 2015b)14. On the material perspective, the very IS´s narratives have been 
constantly changing and diversifying since the group began to dominate vast 
swaths of territory in 2014 to better reflect their social reality and needs (WINTER, 
2015a; GAMBHIR, 2016). In fact, there are already evidences that the organization 
has been recalibrating its messages and overall narrative since its leaders realized 
that territorial retraction was inevitable (WINTER, 2017b).
In this sense, it is useful to shed a light on how the messages and their contents 
changed since the declaration of the Caliphate in 201415 before analyzing how 
the IS has been adapting its narratives and propaganda to survive after the recent 
10 See also: WINTER; PARKER, 2018; WINTER, 2017a.
11 According to Winter (2017c), during its height, the organization was able to publish more than 200 media 
outputs weekly (including videos, radio programs, magazines and photo reports), as well as daily claims about 
its military operations. Evidence suggests that media officials had a direct line to the Caliph himself and their 
work pervaded every aspect of the group in order to create a brand and a utopia of a perfect and functional 
state. Currently, the IS can hardly release 20 media outputs weekly with the utopian message being replaced 
by a nostalgic feeling of missing the glorious days of the Caliphate (WINTER, 2017b). As this reduction of its 
publishing capacity coincides with its territorial losses, it can be inferred that a great part of its propaganda was 
dependent on its territorial control. However, this decrease can also be explained by Intelligence, counterterrorism 
(as many strategists and media centers were neutralized by air strikes) and cyberwarfare actions (WINTER; 
PARKER, 2018; WINTER, 2017d).
12 See also: VIDEO; STERN; BERGER, 2015; WEISS; HASSAN, 2015; ZELIN, 2015.
13 IS has crowdsourced its propaganda in an unprecedented way relying on formal and informal members and 
followers to spread its publications (BARRETT, 2014). These informal members can act as “disseminators”, IS 
fans who share their beliefs and ideology and helps the group by sharing all the IS’S official content (BARRETT, 
2014; WINTER; PARKER, 2018). Some informal members even produced their own propaganda supporting the 
group. These informal members have already become increasingly important due to the decrease of IS’S official 
production. In fact, the informal propaganda is currently responsible for most available pro-IS online material 
(WINTER; PARKER, 2018). These unofficial “operative member” are one of the reasons why IS can sustain its 
presence on the internet.
14 See also: WINTER, 2017a, 2017b; GAMBHIR, 2016; STERN; BERGER, 2015; WEISS; HASSAN, 2015; ZELIN, 2015, 
WARRICK, 2015.
15 The declaration itself represented a turning point regarding the group’s propaganda. Although they were already 
active online before, the declaration of the creation of a Caliphate allowed the construction of new narratives 
related to the utopian idea of a “truly” Islamic state being constructed on earth (LASMAR; FONSECA, 2017).
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setbacks. It was no accident that the IS precipitous rise captured the attention of 
the international media like no other terrorist group before it (NAPOLEONI, 2015)16. 
The IS created a well-planned branding strategy integrated with a professional 
production of propaganda and a unique outsourced dissemination network 
(GARTENISTEIN-ROSS; BARR; MORENG, 2016)17. The production of content and 
narratives of the IS is also very professional and well-thought. The content and 
message of their propaganda is not homogeneous and vary according to both the 
different audiences as well as their diverse strategic goals. These goals range from 
influencing opponents, attracting and seducing potential recruits, to even guiding 
and managing active members, disseminators and proselytizers (WINTER, 2015a; 
2015b). During its height, the IS was also very skillful in customizing and tailoring 
different narratives to different target audiences (LASMAR, FONSECA, 2017). One 
example of such customized messaging can be easy perceived in the dissimilar 
contents found comparing the English and Arabic language IS’s propaganda 
(KHALIL; SHANAHAN, 2016)18. Another example is the distinct difference in 
the messages geared towards western women and those directed at women from 
Muslim-majority countries (RAFIK; MALIK, 2015)19.
In terms of the propaganda’s content, one can identify at least nine recurring 
themes: 1) the religious obligation to migrate to the Caliphate; 2) sectarianism; 3) 
discrediting competition; 4) brutality; 5) mercy; 6) victimhood; 7) war; 8) sense 
of belonging; and 9) utopianism (GARTENISTEIN-ROSS; BARR; MORENG, 2016; 
WINTER, 2015a; 2015b). Possibly one of the main theme in IS’s propaganda after 
the declaration of the Caliphate was the narrative that framed the migration to IS’s 
controlled territories in the same lights of the religious obligation of able Muslims 
to migrate from one’s home when they are persecuted and unable to practice 
their religion (Hijra). This narrative helped portrait the migration to the so-called 
Caliphate as a religious obligation amongst those who accepted such discourse 
and consequently helped to attract thousands of foreign volunteers to their ranks. 
However, as the territorial losses increased, the IS almost stopped invoking religion 
in order to pressure Muslims to travel and join the group (WINTER; PARKER, 
2018). Another important recurring narrative is the discredit of other rival groups – 
16 See also: WINTER, 2015a; WEISS; HASSAN, 2015; STERN; BERGER, 2015; COCKBURN, 2015, McCANTS, 2015.
17 See also: WEISS; HASSAN, 2015; STERN; BERGER, 2015; ZELIN, 2015; ALI, 2015; WINTER, 2015a; 2015b; 
COCKBURN, 2015.
18 See also: EL-BADAWI; COMERFORD; WELBY, 2015.
19 See also: TARRAS-WAHLBERG, 2016; SALTMAN; SMITH, 2015; ALI, 2015.
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especially Al Qaeda – and the sectarian message fueling conflict between Shias and 
Sunnis20 (VALLEE, 2015). Another important aspect of its propaganda has been the 
displays of brutality used to support their triumphalism21 (WINTER, 2015a; 2017b). 
The carefully designed use of violence in their propaganda sought to intimidate 
adversaries, warn local populations of the dangers associated with espionage or 
dissent, provoke outrage from the international media and cause hasty and unwise 
decisions from hostile countries (WINTER, 2015a). The triumphalism, in its turn, 
sought to prove that not only their victories were the sign that their ideals were 
righteous and had God’s blessing, but also to highlight the fact that those who 
joined the group were part of the few enlightened ones (LASMAR; FONSECA, 
2017). Thus, war and violence has always played an important element of their 
propaganda and it is present in roughly 92% of the IS’s current propaganda. 
However, despite the fact that the IS initially tried to deny its recent military 
defeats, it has been forced to abandon the triumphalist discourse. The IS still relies 
on violent images related to the war in Syria and Iraq – such as battles, armored 
vehicles and martyrdom operations – but has increasingly focused more on its 
external operations and the promotion of terrorist attacks around the world. This 
is especially true after mid 2015 when the international coalition began to bomb 
its positions (CLARKE, 2017; LASMAR; FONSECA, 2017). Thus, currently, violence 
and brutality persist in their propaganda materials and narratives. Nevertheless, 
the way violence is framed has significantly changed revealing an underlying shift 
in their objectives. The narrative of violence is no longer used with the objective 
of recruiting or demanding the migration to its territories. Rather, it has become 
geared towards the instigation and guidance of worldwide terrorism (WINTER; 
PARKER, 2018; WINTER, 2017d). 
“Mercy” is another powerful sentiment commonly explored in their material. 
Aimed at potential fighters of other groups as well as civilians who are looking 
for a “second chance”, the IS is portrayed as a merciful group that can forgive 
any previous sins committed by their new recruits. “Victimhood” and “belonging” 
20 Sectarianism is not only an intrinsic part of IS’s ideology but also historically crucial to its strategy. Even now, 
while the dream of the Caliphate was at least interrupted in the Middle East, the IS continues to instigate 
sectarian tensions by targeting Shias and even Christians in countries such as Afghanistan and Egypt (HUME, 
2018; HASSAN, 2017c).
21 However, since the group can no longer boast about its military victories, the IS currently avoids repeating 
the idea that its successes in the battlefield against infidels were enough proof that the Caliphate project was 
sanctioned by God thus abandoning most of the triumphalism present in its older statements. As its military 
victories and territorial control were important features of its narrative, it is possible that the territorial losses 
will have a significant impact in the attractiveness of its propaganda.
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are another classic and recurrent themes in the propaganda of all jihadist groups 
which also figures in a significant share of IS’s publications22. The first conveys 
the message that Muslims worldwide are victims at the hands of a perceived global 
war against Islam. The latter was mostly drawn to its western recruits and used to 
emphasize the idea of brotherhood in the Caliphate (WINTER, 2015a). Although 
these two narratives will always exist, their use has considerably decreased due to 
the IS’s territorial losses (WINTER, 2017d). However, the feeling of “victimhood” 
is being reshaped to explore a feeling of nostalgia about the “unforgettable days” 
of the Caliphate, a project only momentarily interrupted. However, the most 
impacted narrative is that about the utopian life in the Caliphate. In 2015, the 
propaganda about the utopian life in the Caliphate represented more than a half 
of its media output painting a perfect civilian life ranging from free schooling 
and thriving agriculture to an exemplar social welfare. Today, the depictions of 
the Caliphate utopia have almost vanished with only some nostalgic productions 
about its glorious days remaining (WINTER, 2017b; 2017d).
However, one of the most important shifts in IS’s propaganda in the last 3 
years is that related to the far-near enemy dilemma (CLARKE, 2017). Traditionally, 
the IS and its predecessors have always chosen to focus on its closer enemies, i.e. 
the “apostate” regimes ruling Muslim-majority countries (near enemy). Even while 
considering Al Qaeda in Iraq – the most famous IS’s predecessor – it disobeyed 
Bin Laden’s instructions of focusing the attacks on the United States of America 
(far enemy). Nevertheless, after the beginning of the coalition strikes in 2015, IS’s 
propaganda increasingly began to instigate terrorist attacks abroad, especially in 
the Western far enemy countries. Even though most part of the group’s energies 
were spent on local battles against its adversaries on the ground, the IS propaganda 
became more and more interested in portraying any violence against Western 
civilians as a legitimate retribution against the coalition (LASMAR; FONSECA, 
2017). Insofar as the group was losing control of most of its territories, the messages 
that instruct and instigate international terrorism against its “far enemies” became 
one of its main narratives. The scale and number of attacks attributed to IS (being 
it inspired or directed) in the West after 2015 further blurred the lines between the 
22 During its height, between 2014 and 2015, the IS used the narrative of victimhood less than other jihadist groups 
since it was trying to portray itself as victorious and invincible army. The IS has always overstated its gains 
while also downplaying its losses and vulnerabilities (GARTENSTEIN-ROSS; BARR; MORENG, 2016). However, 
after the beginning of coalition’s bombings, the group started to develop the thesis of an existent international 
conspiracy against the Caliphate and the Muslim world (FRONSOM; SIMON, 2015; LASMAR; FONSECA, 2017).
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far/near enemy focus. Furthermore – and rather unfortunately – since the group 
began to change its focus, it has become more effective on inspiring, facilitating 
and enabling foreign terrorist entrepreneurs than Al Qaeda in its best moments23.
There is yet another interesting revision on the IS’s narrative. From the 
moment the group’s setbacks became evident, the group has been relying more 
often on classic jihadist concepts such as “long war”. This is because they want 
to downplay its defeats by painting them as a merely temporary complication. 
The IS has ever since sent messages conveying the idea that they are fighting a 
cross-generational war. Therefore, according to the IS’s leaders, the apostates and 
the “enemies of Islam” are being deceived by thinking that the loss of territories 
equals the IS’s demise (HASSAN, 2017b; COTTEE, 2017). An audio released in 
2016 by the then IS’s number two, al-Adnani, is a good example of how the group 
started to change its narrative insofar IS’s setbacks was becoming undeniable 
(CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018)24:
Whoever thinks that we fight to protect some land or some authority, or that 
victory is measured thereby, has strayed far from the truth. Oh America, 
would we be defeated and you be victorious if you were to take Mosul or 
Sirte or Raqqa? Certainly not! We would be defeated and you victorious only 
if you were able to remove the Quran from Muslims’ hearts (AL-ADNANI 
Apud COTTEE, 2017, p. 1).
More recently, the IS has also re-calibrated their narratives regarding 
hot-topics such as the Israel-Palestine conflict. Even more so after Trump recognized 
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and decided to relocate the American embassy from 
Tel Aviv. The IS has become increasingly critical and vocal about the Palestine 
authorities and organizations such as Hamas. In their view, these groups should 
call for less words and more action. The IS takes advantage of Trump’s moves to 
criticize other Islamist groups: “sixty years and Jerusalem has been in the hands 
of Jews, and it is only now that people cry when the crusaders announced it today 
as their capital” (OSTAEYEN; HAMMING, 2018, p. 1).
23 The IS not only proved to be more effective on using internet, and especially social media platforms but also 
was more efficient on taking advantage of more recent apps which provide the possibility to encrypt messages. 
Some attacks initially attributed to lone actors were later classified as “directed attacks” or even “remote 
controlled” by the IS (CALLIMACHI, 2017).
24 See also: HASSAN, 2017b; COTTEE, 2017.
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Last, but not least, the IS also changed the narratives regarding the tactics 
it has been forced to implement to survive. One interesting example of this shift 
lies in its repositioning on whether or not women can actively engage in combat 
(WINTER; MARGOLIN, 2017)25. While the IS’s predecessor groups (AQI and ISI) 
did extensively use female suicide bombers, the IS and other jihadist groups 
strictly ruled that women should focus on their roles as mothers and wives 
instead of becoming fighters. Possibly, the recent setbacks and sharp decrease 
in its recruitment forced the group to lift its moratorium on women combatants. 
Recent videos and announcements clearly call women to action26 (PEARSON, 2017; 
DEARDEN, 2018; 2017)27. However, it is still controversial whether the group has, 
in fact, lifted the restrictions regarding the role of women in military operation 
and how much of the discourse is actually implemented on the ground28. 
(COTTEE; BLOOM, 2017). Nevertheless, it is clear that IS has indeed changed its 
narrative on the discourse level. Considering the significant implications of this 
change – and regardless if it is only a propaganda strategy or an actual military 
shift – the debate on the women’s role in war is another example of how the IS 
has been adapting its narratives to survive.
There is no doubt that the virtual arena is one of the main domains in which 
the IS struggles to maintain its prominence29 and keep alive the idea of an Islamic 
Caliphate. If, on the one hand, we can verify a relevant decrease of its propaganda 
25 See also: PEARSON, 2017; DEARDEN, 2018; 2017.
26 It is important to highlight that this is a controversial topic. Charlie Winter is one of the analysts who have 
been extensively researching the IS’s propaganda. In a sequence of tweets posted on February 9th on his Twitter 
account, Winter (2018) outlined an interesting timeline showing the evolution of the IS’s messages regarding 
how the group saw the role of women in combat.
27 See also: WINTER; MARGOLIN, 2017.
28 Until September 2017, before witnessing the most recent publications, Cottee and Bloom (2017) were skeptical 
about an actual shift in terms of ideology. In spite of acknowledging that the IS had already stipulated some 
very specific situations in which women were allowed to fight – as it can be easily seen in documents such 
as the al-Khansaa Brigade “manifesto” (AL KHANSAA BRIGADE, 2015) –, the authors seemed to believe that 
it was more a matter of tactical innovation, or a propaganda strategy to shame wavering male supporters into 
action, than a true ideological adaptation.
29 It is also important to emphasize that the IS propaganda is not restricted to online productions. Much, if not 
most, of the IS’s propaganda is primarily designed and implemented for offline purposes. On the ground, many 
locals interviewed said that the bulk of IS’s propaganda efforts were put in face-to-face interactions and written 
materials such as pamphlets and letters as well as others kinds of campaigns such as intimidation of clerics who 
oppose the group. To properly address the extent to which the territorial losses will damage the IS’s appeal in 
the region, it is relevant to understand whether off line propaganda will also be damaged to the same degree. 
Moreover, even the online production decline appears to have been inconsistent, with output levels partially 
recovering in 2018 probably due to production hubs being relocated (WINTER; INGRAM, 2018).
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output, on the other hand, the IS has long been structuring its networks and 
adapting its narratives to remain relevant and alive, winning both hearts and 
minds. However, as argued before, the biggest problem with the idea that the IS 
will become only a “virtual Caliphate” is that it takes the IS’s defeat for granted 
ignoring how the group has, time and again, proved its resilience and overcame 
even harder times throughout its history. As we are going to discuss in the next 
section, there is evidence that the IS has also been changing its military approach 
in tandem with the reshaping of its propaganda (DEMPSEY, 2018). In fact, hints 
of a shift in its military strategy – now much more visible – were already present 
in previous IS’s statements dating back to 2016.
Going underground…again!
There is a general agreement amongst analysts who have been following 
the history of IS and its predecessors30 that the recent territorial losses do not 
necessarily imply the defeat and demise of the organization (SPYER, 2018)31. In 
spite of having lost over 90% of the lands it once controlled, there is a chance that 
the group might actually not be definitively defeated in neither military nor social/
ideological terms (AL-AZM, 2017)32. As will be discussed below, there is some 
evidence that, following its narrative amends, the IS has also been changing its 
military strategy. Increasingly, the group is going back to acting underground and 
progressively relying more on guerrilla tactics and terrorism (SPYER, 2018)33. In 
some instances, the group seems to be even avoiding combat in order to preserve 
its manpower to use it in more favorable times34 (HASSAN, 2017b, AL-AZM, 2017). 
Therefore, repeating a now familiar cycle of expansion and contraction, it is very 
30 Almost two decades if we take into account that the IS originated with the foundation of the Jama'at al-Tawhid 
wal-Jihad back in 1999.
31 See also: CLARKE, 2018; CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; JOSCELYN, 2018; JONES; DOBBINS; BYMAN; CHIVVIS; 
CONNABLE; MARTINI; ROBINSON; CHANDLER, 2017; DEMPSEY, 2018; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; BURKE, 
2017, BUNZEL, 2016; 2017; COTTEE, 2017; COCKBURN, 2018; 2017;  Al-AZM, 2017; MANSOUR; AL-HASHMI, 
2017; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017; ABRAMS, 2017; MESEROLE, 2017; SKY 2017; HASSAN, 2017c.
32 See also: JONES; DOBBINS; BYMAN; CHIVVIS; CONNABLE; MARTINI; ROBINSON; CHANDLER, 2017; BUNZEL, 
2016; 2017.
33 See also: CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; DEMPSEY, 2018; JONES; DOBBINS; BYMAN; CHIVVIS; CONNABLE; 
MARTINI; ROBINSON; CHANDLER, 2017; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c.
34 This strategic and temporary “cease-fire” can be compared to the idea of Hudna implemented in certain occasions 
by islamist groups such as Hamas.
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 14, n. 1, 2019, p. 103-126
114 Adapting for Survival: Islamic State Shifting Strategies
likely that the IS will once again act from the shadows of the urban centers and 
remote areas of desert attempting to preserve some strength while it awaits an 
opportunity to reemerge (DEMPSEY, 2018)35.
It can be argued that the campaign to destroy the Caliphate started in 2014 
has largely achieved its objective. After three and half years, the international 
coalition and its regional partners were able to recover as much as 90% of the 
territories that IS once seized (SPYER, 2018; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b). The flux of 
foreign fighters to the region was also interrupted, seriously reducing the group’s 
capacity to expand and threat other countries. As mentioned above, the territorial 
losses also impacted the group’s ability to produce propaganda in a large scale. In 
sum, on can say that the IS is in its weakest moments since 2014 and it no longer 
represent the same degree of threat (JOHNSTON, 2017)36. Nevertheless, although 
all these statements are true, these accomplishments are not enough to draw any 
conclusions. Whereas the IS might have been adapting itself to survive, some of 
the conditions and external events that enable its last resurgence – such as the 
American withdraw or the Arab Spring – are unlikely to be replicated in the near 
future (COCKBURN, 2018; ZELIN, 2017).
It is important to remember that the organization has overcome worse periods 
before. Around 2010, for instance, before the US withdraw, the IS had also almost 
suffered a total defeat. However, it managed to rise again doing exactly what they 
seem to be currently doing. Even before 2010, the IS predecessor (named ISI, Islamic 
state of Iraq) adapted its strategy downsizing and returning to guerilla and terrorism 
tactics. It avoided open battles against US counterinsurgency and the Sunni tribe 
forces that had rebelled against the group (CHANDLER, 2017)37. The pattern of 
the recent attacks on the ground seems to support the IS’s statements suggesting 
that it has already contracted in order to preserve its manpower and regroup in 
a more favorable operational environment (COCKBURN, 2018)38. Although since 
2016 the group has been increasingly adopting terrorism and guerrilla tactics in 
Syria and Iraq, the great mark on the strategic and tactical shifts happened after 
the liberation of Mosul (CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; HASSAN, 2017b). In the 
fall of 2016, the IS’s leader al-Baghdadi called on IS fighters to fight to death in 
35 See also: HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; BUNZEL, 2017; AL-AZM, 2017.
36 See also: HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; BURKE, 2016, BUNZEL, 2016; 2017; COTTEE, 2017; Al-AZM, 2017; MANSOUR; 
AL-HASHMI, 2017; BAHNEY.
37 See also: JONES; DOBBINS; BYMAN; CHIVVIS; CONNABLE; MARTINI; ROBINSON; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; 
STERN; BERGER, 2015; WEISS; HASSAN, 2015; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
38 See also: CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; BURKE, 2017; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
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order to defend the city. Such a call was strictly obeyed by thousands of people 
who ended up killed after bloody urban battles and airstrikes that left Mosul in 
ruins. Since losing its second major urban center, the IS has not again fought to 
the last man to maintain control of any other city or village, even in crucial areas 
(HASSAN, 2017b)39. In regions such as Tal Afar and Hawija, hundreds of fighters 
chose to flee or even surrender rather than resisting the liberation forces. In Raqqa 
– while most analysts were expecting the same determination displayed in Mosul 
– hundreds of local IS’s fighters seemed to have even struck a deal to be evacuated 
from the city without being killed (SOMMERVILLE; DALATI, 2017)40. Even more 
surprisingly, the resistance in the Euphrates River area, around towns as such Deir 
ez-Zor, was low. These towns were once the most important remaining IS base of 
operations. In summation, recently, IS forces have largely melted away from places 
rather than openly confronting Iraqi, Syrian and Kurdish forces (COCKBURN, 
2018)41. Surely, many factors have contributed to explain why IS’s fighters have 
been vanishing before the battles: loss of morale after the fall of Mosul; the desire 
of less committed fighters to save themselves, and; the disintegration of part of 
the group leadership after years of war. Still, the lack of resistance displayed 
suggests that these withdraws are actually part of an old strategy of dispersing 
and conserving its manpower in order to adopt a more calculated insurgency 
(BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017)42. Regarding some liberated areas and even zones 
where the IS never had the full control, such as Baghdad and Diyala Province, the 
group has been mounting successful terrorist attacks. As it did around 2010, the 
IS is already working to provoke the Iraqi government to crack down on Sunnis 
and, thus, cause sectarian strife. The Sunni/Shia opposition in Iraq has been one 
of the group’s core narratives for recruiting locally and forms a strong part of its 
political legitimacy claims (CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018)43. The use of tactics 
such as hit-and-run strikes as well as assassinations of authorities are increasing 
at these areas and at the borderlands straddling Iraq and Syria44. This is also 
39 See also: COCKBURN, 2018; 2017, BURKE, 2017; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
40 See also: HASSAN, 2017b; COCKBURN, 2018; 2017.
41 See also: CLARKE; MOGHADAM, 2018; HASSAN, 2017b.
42 See also: JONES; DOBBINS; BYMAN; CHIVVIS; CONNABLE; MARTINI; ROBINSON; CHANDLER, 2017; CLARKE; 
MOGHADAM, 2018; HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; COCKBURN, 2018; 2017; BURKE, 2017.
43 See also: HASSAN, 2017b; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
44 Interestingly Hassan (2017b) compares what the border between Syria and Iraq means to the IS to what the 
border between Afghanistan and Pakistan means to the Taliban. According to the author, even though the IS 
has suggested that it could withdraw to the desert as in the past, its attacks will still focus on urban centers 
with rural areas as pathways allowing the movement between the two terrains. In this sense, the border region 
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important because these attacks are rarely accounted for in official statements 
related to the progress of the fight against the IS (HASSAN, 2017b). Additionally, 
the group is already taking advantage of all areas where the geography and social 
environment is difficult for counterinsurgency operations, such as deserts45 and 
certain urban centers and rural areas (HASSAN, 2017b).
Some analysts state that actually this shift is part of a strategy planned around 
mid 2016. In that occasion, the IS leadership realized that territorial losses were 
inevitable due to the involvement of Russia and Turkey with the international 
coalition (DEMPSEY, 2018)46. This claim is based on the fact that the IS has been 
sporadically hinting at this kind of strategic shift since some unclear messages 
came out in 2016. The speech given by al-Adnani in May 2016, for example, 
conveyed that the rise and fall of his group was only part of a larger historical 
flow – as a deliberate process – since the early days of the Iraq war. Therefore, 
territorial losses would be just a new chapter in which the objective of weakening 
the enemies would assume other forms. Hence, the propaganda works in tandem 
with the tactics (DEMPSEY, 2018) increasing the morale of its members with 
the idea of an organization impossible to be defeated in much the same way as 
the mythical Phoenix (HASSAN, 2017b). Coincidently or not, after this speech 
IS’s videos and publications such as Al Naba increasingly began to portray the 
desert as the best place to launch its post-Caliphate insurgency47. In recent 
statements, the IS’s leaders have explicitly compared the current situation with 
the dire conditions faced by the group around 2008 and suggested that adopting 
the same strategy will work now as it did before (BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017)48. 
In a series of articles published in Al Naba in September and October 2017, the 
group explains why it would be unwise to openly confront military forces that 
have the continuous support of American and Russian air forces. These articles 
argued that such enemy’s ground forces had as their main objective to expose 
IS’s ground fighters so that they could be targeted by drones and aerial strikes 
between the two countries – an area full of desert areas, river valleys, rural towns and small urban centers 
– will likely be crucial to the IS’s strategy as it provides a hospitable environment and strategic sanctuaries.
45 According to Cockburn (2017), since 2016 the IS has prepared bunkers, weapons caches and food stocks in the 
deserts and semi-deserts between Iraq and Syria as they did around 2011 in order to prepare for its comeback.
46 See also: HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b; 2016; BUNZEL, 2017; BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
47 Multiple videos released by the IS reflect the return of the group’s insurgency activities in liberated areas using 
hit-and-run attacks as well as assassinations in order to lower the enemy’s morale and spread fear, just like the 
IS did around 2010 (HASSAN, 2017b).
48 See also: HASSAN, 2017b.
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(HASSAN, 2017b). According to Hassan (2017b) these statements likely support 
and reflect the shifts in the IS’s strategy after the fall of Mosul49.
The future of Isis
Prudence is always warranted when making predictions, perhaps more so when 
it comes to the Middle East. Although history and current signs of adaptations seem 
to suggest that the IS could rise again, it is premature to state either its rebirth 
or its demise. Many intermediary outcomes may take place between these two 
extremes of the spectrum. Possible future scenarios include the disintegration of the 
organization (FARAS, 2017); and the appearance of splinters or sub-organizations 
(which usually are more extreme than their parent organization). A less probable 
scenario of merger with Al Qaeda or other insurgent or terrorist groups; a shift in 
focus towards other regions such as Libya, Afghanistan, Yemen or Philippines in 
order to create new sanctuaries, and so on. So far, however, it is hard to identify 
any other geographical theater exerting the force of attraction that Iraq and Syria 
have most recently (COOLSAET, 2017).
Altogether, the problems with stating that the IS has already been defeated 
are threefold. First, and as explained in the previous section, the IS has overcome 
worse moments before. The second reason why assuming a definitive defeat of IS 
would be a hasty analysis is that the international coalition may have defeated the 
organization militarily, but not ideologically, socially or even politically (BURKE, 
2017)50. The United States and its partners may claim to have won the war that 
began in 2014 but they certainly seem to have lost the political and social battles 
that began much earlier, especially given the evidence that the Sunni communities 
in both Syria and Iraq feel more hopeless now than ever before (MESEROLE, 
2017)51. The coalition has not yet identified any Sunni actors in either country who 
command broad local legitimacy and, in the absence of effective Sunni governance, 
it is likely that the population will turn to new, old or rebranded armed militant 
groups (BUNZEL, 2017)52. Furthermore, with many actors posing as victors in 
49 It is important to highlight that even the coalition’s US commander, Gen. Joseph Votel, had acknowledged in 
2016 that the IS was apparently “reverting in some regards back to their terrorist roots” (HASSAN, 2017b, p.4).
50 See also: BUNZEL, 2017; HASSAN, 2017a.
51 See also: BURKE, 2017; HASSAN, 2017a; 2016.
52 See also: HASSAN, 2016; 2017a; MESEROLE, 2017; AL-AZM, 2017.
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the war against the IS – including the Kurds, Iranians, Russians and Turks – and, 
more importantly – with all of them more concerned with war spoils rather than 
effective governance, it is fair to expect that most of the ongoing arrangements 
regarding who will administer the areas once controlled by the IS will engender 
more instability as well as ethnic and sectarian tensions. All this uncertainty will 
potentially continue to fuel extremism creating conditions that could eventually 
warrant the rise of a reincarnated version of the IS in the region (Al-AZM, 2017). 
Unless this aspect of the war on the IS is acknowledged, Western-backed forces are 
likely to “keep winning” the same war countless times. Yet whilst they congratulate 
themselves, as the world has been witnessing since 9/11, entire towns face multiple 
destructions, their populations suffer and extremism becomes both more widespread 
and much more deeply entrenched (BURKE, 2017; HASSAN, 2017a). To sum up, the 
prospects of a new IS resurrection in the Levant depends upon three main factors: 
1) the quality of governance and legitimate Sunni leadership in Sunni areas; 2) 
the continuation of sectarian politics by the Shia dominated central governments 
of Iraq and Syria; and 3) the capacity to rebuild Sunni majority towns destroyed 
in the war against IS, either through external assistance or through initiatives 
undertaken by local institutions (BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017). If these issues remain 
unresolved, they could potentially enable the IS to continue using its preferred 
tactics of insurgency and terrorism, which would in turn undoubtedly provoke a 
harsh government response against local Sunni communities that are perceived 
to provide legitimacy to the organization. The danger thus lies in potentially 
engendering a cyclical pattern of violence and retribution, which would make 
conflict resolution in the region even more difficult, if not downright impossible 
(BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017; HASSAN, 2017a).
A third reason as to why it is too early to state whether or not the IS has 
already been defeated is related to its finances. Only two years ago, the organization 
was regarded as one of the wealthiest terrorist group in existence. Its funding was 
derived from a variety of sources ranging from levying taxes and human trafficking 
to the export of commodities such as oil and blood antiquities (AL TAMIMI, 
2015)53. Much of its revenue was contingent upon its control over vast tracts of 
territory across Iraq and Syria. In the recent months the IS has lost considerable 
swarths of areas it previously dominated and concomitantly an estimated 80% 
of its funds (MANSOUR; HASHIMI, 2018a; 2018b). In addition, the United States 
53 See also: FATF, 2015; STERN; BERGER, 2015; BARRETT, 2014.
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and its allies undertook an aerial bombing campaign striking not only revenue-
generating locations but also warehouses, caches and trucks holding IS cash. Still, 
some analysts continue to believe that this damage is not enough to undermine IS’s 
capacity to finance and organize a dangerous insurgency (MANSOUR; HASHIMI, 
2018a; 2018b; 2017; HAID, 2017). One of the problems seems to be that, as is the 
case with its ongoing tactical innovations54 and narrative adaptations, not much 
attention is being paid to how the IS’s economic practices are also evolving. This 
pattern of evolution in all three fields is effectively enabling the group to rapidly 
adjust to its significant losses on the ground. It is important to note that while 
territorial losses jeopardize the IS’s sources of revenue on the one hand, they also 
generate tremendous opportunities for financial innovation and evolution thanks 
to the existence of a ‘war economy’ (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2017)55.
Mansour and Hashimi (2018a; 2018b) argue that, according to their Iraqi 
government sources, the IS has smuggled an estimated 400 million dollars out 
of Iraq and Syria during its recent retreat. Apart from the “hawala system”56 that 
has been used to transport cash outside the Caliphate (HAID, 2017), it has been 
reported that since 2016 the group is using the cash looted from Mosul as well as 
that earned from its diverse funding sources to speculate on international stock 
markets. Evidence suggests that much of its money was wired to Jordanian banks 
and could be re-introduced into the Iraqi financial system (i.e. the white market) 
via Baghdad or even through “hawala” (FREEMAN, 2016)57. The group has also 
already heavily invested in the Iraqi market via legitimate businesses, relying 
on middlemen who are inspired not by the IS’s ideology but by the prospect of 
economic gain (MANSOUR; HASHIMI, 2018a; 2018b; 2017; HAID, 2017). Many of 
these middlemen are tribal leaders or businessmen with clean records who can 
easily hide their links to the organization. According to analysts, the IS’s modus 
operandi involves providing a sum of cash to these middlemen who then invest 
it in a business enterprise – for instance, car dealerships, electronic shops or 
pharmacies and small exchange houses – and the group then simply takes a cut 
from the profits accrued. These sorts of enterprises typically do not require formal 
qualifications or high investments and tend to be cash-intensive. As a result, they 
54 On terrorist groups’ innovation, see SINGH, 2016.
55 See also: MANSOUR; HASHIMI, 2018; 2017; HAID, 2017; EMERSON, 2018.
56 Hawala denotes “in the care of” in Hindi. This popular way of transmitting cash across state boundaries does 
not involve any formalised movement of money. Thus, there is no way to trace the transaction.
57 See also: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2018; HAID, 2017.
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are particularly attractive to terrorist groups because cash intensive businesses 
are characterised by high-volume, low-value transactions, often with lax financial 
oversight, which can be easily manipulated to hide gains and/or co-mingle with 
illegal assets (FATF, 2015; SINGH; LASMAR, forthcoming).
On the other hand, and at the other end of the spectrum, a resurrection by 
the IS would be more difficult feat to accomplish than the last time because local, 
regional and international forces supposedly would not make the same mistakes. In 
other words, whilst undoubtedly the IS has learned since the American intervention 
of Iraq in 2003, most of its enemies have also grasped how the organization tends 
to behave during unfavorable periods (COCKBURN, 2018). Furthermore, even 
those Sunnis who once welcomed the rule of the IS has learnt from experience 
that the tyranny of the IS can be worse than that of previous leaders, suggesting 
that these communities would be less likely to view the group as the lesser of 
two evils a second time (COCKBURN, 2018). Moreover, analysts like Zelin (2017) 
also highlight the many differences between the current overall circumstances 
and the environment that existed in the region in 2013-2014, which makes it 
highly unlikely that the IS would be able to once again dominate territory to the 
extent, and at the pace, that it did previously. It seems more likely that the IS’s 
current territorial swarth will dissolve into a series of unconnected strongholds 
rather than the large swaths of land it once dominated. As stated previously, the 
fortuitous sequence of events that enabled the rise of IS after 2011 such as the 
American military withdraw from Iraq, the Arab Spring or massive operations 
such as “Breaking the Walls”58 are unlikely to occur again.
Furthermore, the region is unlikely to receive a massive flow of foreign 
fighters as it did in the 2012-2015 period, not only because their countries of origin 
have already implemented new legal regimes in order to impede the recruitment 
of potential volunteers but also because neighboring Turkey has cracked down 
on foreign fighter movement through its territories. Without the same scale of 
foreign recruitment, the IS will have less potential manpower (ZELIN, 2017). 
According to Zelin (2017) another difference would be that regional Shia forces, 
under expanding Iranian influence, will not tolerate any visible efforts by the IS 
58 During the American counterinsurgency campaign against the IS predecessor (ISI), the US and Iraq governments 
arrested most of the captured group’s members in just a few prisons. This allowed the IS to both recruit new 
members in prison as well as to keep their ideology alive. Later, between 2011 and 2014, the IS stormed Iraqi 
jails in operations, such as “Breaking the Walls” and filled its ranks with thousands of freed inmates that were 
hardcore jihadists and veteran insurgents.
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to reconsolidate and rebuild in the Levant, making future territorial gains by the 
group more difficult to both achieve and/or sustain (ZELIN, 2017). The ground in 
Syria is also now much less favorable to the IS since, unlike in 2011, the group now 
faces a multitude of new actors in the region (e.g. Russia and Turkey), which, once 
again, makes it more difficult to conquer territory and/or recruit local Sunnis than 
it has in the past (ZELIN, 2017). Lastly, Coolsaet (2017) points out that prediction 
exercises often tend to overestimate the capacity of jihadist groups to survive 
significant setbacks, especially given that in times of crises terrorist leadership is 
more inclined to be preoccupied with its own survival rather than organizational 
integrity, as was seen with Al Qaeda’s core immediately post-9/11 for instance.
The future of the IS or the appearance of a successor depends much more 
on local politicians and institutions rather than measures implemented by world 
and regional powers intervening in Syria and Iraq. Still, some external assistance 
may well be necessary to strengthen Iraqi institutions thereby preventing other 
insurgent/militant actors from filling any vacuum left by the IS (JOSCELYN, 2018; 
SKY, 2017). Just as the 2010 Iraqi elections exerted a significant impact upon the 
group’s rebirth in the post-2011 period, the presidential elections due to be held 
in 2018 also represent a critical turning point for the future of Sunni extremism 
in Iraq. The chances of an IS resurgence is more likely if Iraq once again fails to 
achieve effective Sunni political representation and a more inclusive government 
(JOSCELYN, 2018; SKY, 2017). In short, the territorial defeat of IS should not 
lull the United States and other powers into a false sense of security with the 
concomitant danger of military and political disengagement (HASSAN, 2015b)59. 
One of the key problems of the current administration in Washington is that it 
seems determined to disengage from the region, especially given that the 2018 
National Defense Strategy appears to have shifted the United States’ focus from 
terrorism to what appears to be long-term strategic competition with countries 
like Russia and China60 (JOSCELYN, 2018). Even though the future of the region 
is heavily dependent upon local actors and their capacity to rebuild effective 
political and social institutions, diplomatic efforts by the US and the international 
community can still play an important role in enabling more inclusive and less 
sectarian politics and thus help to undercut extremism and instability in the region.
59 See also: JOSCELYN, 2018; SKY, 2017; WEISS, HASSAN, 2015 c.
60 Recently, president Trump has also talked about an American withdraw from Syria and Iraq.
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Conclusion
So far, the campaign to destroy the Caliphate project is questionably successful 
even though the international coalition and its regional partners have largely 
recovered almost all the land the IS once controlled. The campaign also successfully 
interrupted the massive flow of foreign fighters to the IS and other regional Islamist 
groups. As described above, these territorial losses also negatively impacted the 
IS propaganda output. Thus, one can argue that the IS is at its weakest since 
2014 (HASSAN, 2017a; 2017b)61. Nevertheless, there is much evidence that the 
group is already adapting to survive, especially in what regards its propaganda 
and military tactics. 
This is also true in another important battlefield: the internet. The IS has 
been recalibrating its on-line narrative on a variety of issues ranging from new 
understandings about the women’s role in combat to an increased focus on 
“external terrorist operations” in order to keep its ideology alive. It is important 
to understand that due to its decentralized and flexible network of informal 
disseminators, the group ideology will likely remain alive online despite all the 
efforts to curb its propaganda and output. However, the survival of an idea of a 
virtual Caliphate is as dangerous as the existence of a territorial Caliphate. The 
danger lies in believing that the current military defeats of the IS in Iraq and 
Syria necessarily equals to a permanent military, social and political demise of 
the group. In fact, as argued here, there are strong evidences that the IS has long 
prepared for surviving a loss of territory by morphing, adapting, and returning 
to low-intensity warfare tactics such as terrorism, assassinations and hit-and run 
attacks. It is important to remember that this would not be the first time the IS 
adopted this modus operandi.
However, we argue that predicting either the demise or the survival of the 
IS is still a premature endeavor. The current scenario on the ground is starkly 
different from 2011 when many believed the group was defeated. When predicting 
the future of the IS in the region it is necessary to acknowledge that it will be 
heavily impacted, first and foremost, by Syria and Iraq’s ability to not only 
develop their political and social institutions but also address Sunni and Shia 
grievances in their respective territories. Furthermore, the role of ideology cannot 
61 See also: BURKE, 2016, BUNZEL, 2016; 2017; COTTEE, 2017; Al-AZM, 2017; MANSOUR; AL-HASHMI, 2017; 
BAHNEY; JOHNSTON, 2017.
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be understated. Indeed, unless and until Iraq, Syria as well as intervening countries 
and international society are unable to understand both the power of ideologies as 
well as that the fact that the existence of the IS and similar groups are symptoms 
of deeper local problems rather than the cause, the challenges in the region will 
persist. This is significant because, as Sky says, “what happens in Iraq, does not 
stay in Iraq” (SKY, 2017, p. 1).
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